

Youth Exodus:
Forced Migration of Youths from Southern Thailand Towards Malaysia (2004-2019)

Landscape Analysis 17 March 2021

IMAN RESEARCH
SOCIETY • BELIEFS • PERCEPTION

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This study took place during the final quarter of 2020 as the pandemic raged throughout South-east Asia. It was a challenge to complete especially with strict movement control orders (MCO) and covid-19 measures. However, it would not have been possible without the trust, support and friendship of the Patani-Muslim community in Malaysia as well as in the Deep South. Many individuals and organisations had assisted us in this journey. IMAN Research would like to extend our sincere thanks to all of them.

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Seal of Regions: Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and Songkhla

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• Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) -
Translates to the National Revolutionary Front, a territorial organisation based in the Deep South which aims for the independence of the Pattani region. It is one of the biggest stakeholders in the ongoing conflict and often chosen as the region's representative in peace talks. An organised group, BRN acts as a paramilitary wing. It is recognised as the main force behind the insurgency movement in the Deep South.

• Deep South -
Region consisting of the three southern most provinces in Thailand: Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat

• Malaysia -
Country in Southeast Asia, neighbouring Thailand. For this study, the term exclusively refers to Peninsular Malaysia.

• Patani Muslim -
Person of Malay ethnicity from the Deep South region of Thailand, who subscribes to Islam as a religion.

• Pattani -
Province in the Deep South but may also refer to the greater region of historical Patani, formerly ruled by the Sultanate of Patani.

• Thaification -
Process of assimilation of Thai citizens from different cultural and ethnic back grounds into a dominant Thai culture.

• Tomyam -
A famous Thai soup dish often served in restaurants owned by Patani Muslims in Malaysia.

• Ulama -
Muslim scholars trained in the interpretation and teaching of religious knowledge.

• United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) -
UN agency for protection and aid to refugees, forcibly displaced communities and stateless individuals.

• Wahabbism -
Religious movement and orthodox doctrine of Islamic faith based on puritan and literal interpretation of the Quran.

2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The increasing number of anecdotal evidence suggest that there has been a rise of young adults moving to Malaysia looking for employment post 2004. IMAN's current hypothesis is that this movement is a direct result of the violence and detention occurring in the Deep South coupled by lack of economic growth.

The psychosocial and financial impact from the unrest in the Deep South will have long-term effect on community development. There is also growing recognition of the psychological impact of conflict on the civilian population exposed to repeated cycles of extreme violence. Yet there is a gap of evidence on mental health, and general health problems experienced by the affected population, including the young adults mentioned above. By identifying the types and scope of these problems, we can start to work on addressing factors that can help and increase the resilience of Deep South youths, while they face the uncertainties of this prolonged conflict. It is also hoped that sustainable policy and programmatic proposals can be put forward.

2.1 Aim of Landscape

The aim of this landscape is to provide a multi-faceted overview based on existing available information and data of the Patani Muslim migrant community in Malaysia, the effect of the escalation of violence over the past 20 years on the community, and identify strengths and challenges that are meaningful from the perspective of the community itself.

2.2 Key Central Conclusion from the Landscape

Migration to Malaysia is a flight strategy from the violence in the Deep South, especially fear of arbitrary detention for the men. There is a significant number of irregular migrant workers coming into Malaysia via tourist visas. These irregular migrants include young unmarried women.

In terms of violence and impact on the community, there is evidence that the community is struggling with mental health issues. Direct mental health intervention is crucial for the community both in the Deep South and Malaysia. A cross-sectional study is needed to understand the impact of violence on mental health well-being of the community. It should be noted that women are also affected, and different strategies and intervention programmes are required to address their issues because of the multiple roles they are more likely to play.

In the peace negotiation, it is proposed to expand the parties involved to include civil society organisations.

Southern Thailand is situated above the Malay Peninsula, and is a distinctive Malay-Muslim region within Thailand. It has a population of around nine million people, and is made up of 14 provinces, with the provinces - Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala and parts of Songkla the most affected by the ongoing insurgency.

The insurgency officially originated around 1948, and by the late 1950s, a political independence campaign was displaced by an armed insurgency. This had de-escalated by the late 1980s and for about a decade there was relative calm. However, in 2004, the violence re-emerged to what it is today, and is said to be more complex and volatile.

Central to the conflict is identity politics. Around 80 percent of the local community are Malay-Muslims who call themselves the Patani people. They speak mainly in Malay, practice the Islamic faith, and their education and the legal system is steeped in Islam. The central Thai government has been trying to change the South elite and political structures to be more secular and Thai-orientated for years, without much avail.

Successive governments have been trying to control the insurgency, starting with the respective Thaksin and Abhisit governments in the early and late 2000s. A number of peace talks have been held for several years under the auspices of the Malaysian government, between Thai officials and Mara Patani, an umbrella body representing several southern insurgent groups, but unfortunately little progress has been made due to the absence of Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN). BRN, a major rebel group operating in the area, refused to participate in peace talks until recently. However, positive change took place with the first formal meeting held with BRN in January 2020, Kuala Lumpur Malaysia.

To date, there have been 20,595 injuries and deaths attributed to the Southern Thailand conflict, particularly in Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and Songkla (Jitpiromsri, 2014). The conflict has resulted in the lack of economic growth; there has been nearly zero spill-over effect from the booming economies of Hatyai or even the border districts such as Betong or Ban Da Nok which have not been touched by the violence, to the extent of being called the "oasis of peace and harmony" (Ball, 2012). One can make many assumptions as to why the tourist related areas are protected from the conflict.

The chart below measures the poverty rate in the Southern Thai as highest in the region as of 2017 with the two poorest provinces being Pattani and Narathiwat, neighbouring provinces in the conflict-affected Southern region with poverty rates of 34.2% and 34.17% respectively.



The Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 established the present-day border of what is present day Thailand and Malaysia. The Malay-Patani region of Southern Thailand is made up of the three southernmost provinces and parts of a fourth known as Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and Songkla. Bangkok's rule was tenuous in the early days; the Siamese kings tolerated Islamic customs in lieu of Thai civil law. After the 1930s, the process of "Thai-ification" began, aimed at creating a cohesive sense of national identity by homogenizing social and cultural practices. By the late 1950s, what started as a political independence campaign was displaced by an armed insurgency that persists until today. The situation had significantly de-escalated by the 1980s but started again in 2001, and this time becoming more complex and violent especially post Tak Bai and Krue Se in 2004. Between 2004 to 2017 more than 7,000 have died, 6,000 children lost a parent and 3,000 women were widowed (International Crisis Group, 2016).

The reactivation and escalation of the conflict in 2004 have mostly been blamed on the southern insurgents. However, during Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's term, wide-ranging emergency powers were implemented to deal with the southern violence. This had caused the insurgency to escalate further. After the ousting of Thaksin, the junta implemented a major policy shift by replacing Thaksin's earlier approach with a campaign to win over the "hearts and minds" of the insurgents. Despite little progress in curbing the violence, the junta declared that security was improving and that peace would come to the region by 2008 but by March 2008 the death toll surpassed 3,000 (Amnesty International, 2009).

The Democrat-led government of Abhisit Vejjajiva was also optimistic and confident of bringing peace to the region in 2010 but by the end of 2010 insurgency-related violence had escalated, confounding the government's optimism. Finally, in March 2011, the government conceded that violence was increasing and could not be solved in a few months.

The Southern Thai conflict is a centuries old war that has seen different waves of conflict over the decades. It has been victim to the ever-changing political dynamics of Southeast Asia. Before the colonial period, the region was contested by rival kingdoms, and the arrival of the British, and Siam's own need to survive, saw Southern Thai again become part of the barter. Post colonialism saw the rise of nationalism sweeping through the entire Southeast Asian region, and the Deep South was no exception with the emergence of Malay Nationalism, the challenge of Communism and the Islamic resurgence. The Southern Thai conflict is complex and an amalgamation of many things. The differences in language, culture and religion, not to mention ties to Malaysia and the rest of Islamic Southeast Asia, are part of the challenge. (Ball, 2012). A religious issue – Islam and Islamist insurgents. However, a question does arise: if the conflict is about Islam, then why have the thousands of the northern Muslim Thais not shown solidarity for their Southern Malays bretherens.

This brings us to the question: who is involved and at the center of this conflict? The perception is that those involved are Muslims, Thai Muslims to be exact. By focusing the problem on religion, this has resulted in the approach taken to resolve the issue also from a religious angle. For example, regular seminars were conducted by authorities on promotion of inter-religious understanding. This view not only over simplifies the conflict but it sidesteps the root causes of the conflict, pushing aside the grievances of the Patani people. Therefore, denying that this conflict is in fact a political struggle between Patani and Bangkok's central government's legitimacy to rule over the Pattani region.

There have been a number of attempts to address the situation since 2013. However, the peace dialogue process between the Thai government and the MARA Patani (Majlis Syura Patani, or Patani Consultative Council), an umbrella organisation of Muslim separatist fronts from southern Thailand reached a stumbling block. The process, facilitated by Malaysia, was beleaguered by deep mutual mistrust, internal divisions on both sides and a lack of resolve to risk changes that offer better prospects for peace (International Crisis Group, 2016). To add further, BRN after the 2014 military coup refused to take any further part of the dialogue process.

The rural guerrillas in the Deep South are known locally as juwae ("warriors'') in the local dialect. The most important juwae group is the BRN, who has the most significant influence and several thousand members on the ground (Askew & Helbardt, 2012). BRN's participation in the peace dialogue is critical. During the 1st dialogue in 2013 with the Yingluck Shinawatra government (before the coup), BRN's preliminary demands were:

1. Malaysia must be a mediator in the peace talks, not just a facilitator.
2. The Thai state must recognize the talks as being between Malays in Patani, led by BRN, and the Thai state.
3. This negotiation must be witnessed by representatives of the ASEAN countries, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and NGOs.
4. The Thai state must release all insurgent suspects and inmates, and cancel all arrest warrants without condition.
5. The Thai state must recognize BRN as an independence movement, not a separatist one. (International Crisis Group, 2016)

However, improvements are in sight with the resumption of peace talks in March 2020 in Kuala Lumpur but this time with the participation of BRN. Unfortunately, subsequent COVID-19 global pandemic has put a pause to the proceedings.

4.1 The Conflict Is Disproportionately Affecting Youths

According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) report, the Krue Se standoff[1] and Tak Bai massacre[2] that both occurred in 2004 fed into the grand narrative of the Deep South's youths, to fight and protect their land, serves as a powerful recruiting tool for the insurgency. The narrative provided context and justification for the armed insurgency and just like in most areas of violent conflict, the target of recruitment is almost always the young and overwhelmingly male.

The Thai government strategy to address the insurgency has been problematic from the beginning. Deploying 60,000 security forces in the Southern provinces and the implementation of special security laws – the Martial law and Emergency decree. The martial law and emergency decrees allow detention without a court warrant and trial for up to 37 days. These strategies and coupled with a disorganised security force riddled with corruption, it only exacerbated the situation on the ground. (Abuza Z. , 2011)

Local and international human rights organisations have stated that the special security laws have given rise to a culture of impunity in the Deep South. According to reports from human rights organisations, among the violations are enforced disappearances, extra-judicial killings, arbitrary detentions and torture of detainees. The government argues that targeting young men is essential since they are prone to be the perpetrators, i.e. supporting or joining the insurgency. The targeting of young men believed to be at "battle ready age'' and deemed as a security threat is part of the government's strategy; this has had a negative impact on the community as a whole. While the detainees are predominantly if not exclusively male, the implication of their incarceration affects their families directly, with long lasting negative impact at the cost of the whole community.

According to documentation by local non-profit organisations (NGOs) in Southern Thailand, youths as young as 18 years old have been detained from as short as a few days to nine years. Once released, the feeling of not being able to catch-up from the lost years has detrimental psychological and economic impact, as they feel that they have lost their potential to work. There are limited studies on the impact of the conflict towards youths and the coping mechanisms in place.

There has been a rise of young adults moving to Malaysia to look for employment after the Tak Bai massacre and subsequent incidents (Panjor & Jitpiromsri, 2016). It has been quoted that this migration is due to lack of economic opportunity and the increasing violence. This is supported by the CSCD 2014 report that due to restrictions in employment, movement, and incomplete education, many young men look for opportunities in Malaysia where they can easily blend in. Young women on the other hand, also look for employment in Malaysia but for different reasons: to help support families either due to male family members being detained or unable to work. Most enter Malaysia using tourist visas and work in the food and beverage sector, predominantly the "Tom Yum Restaurants''.

Among the most significant effects of the outflow of youths, in particular young men leaving the Deep South, is the gender imbalance arising in villages, as young working age men are absent or are unable to find employment. The Deep South is culturally deeply rooted in tradition and religiously conservative in nature, and having to adapt to a significant change in gender roles has been challenging for both the men and women. Women suddenly have to take over the role as the breadwinner and in many cases also become the head of households. This has impacted the health and psychological wellbeing of the women as well as families, due to the stress and social stigma of having a relative being an ex-detainee and/or unemployed.

Another direct impact of the violence is the lack of economic development. In areas that have been gazetted as red zones, the lack of employment opportunities is very evident. The three provinces collectively as a whole are considered among areas with the least economic development in Thailand. The lack of economic spill over effect from neighbouring Hat Yai would strengthen the assumption that the violence is hindering economic development.

4.2 Impact Towards the Community

The types of violence that are usually cited by the media in the Deep South are bombings, killings/assassinations and shootings conducted by rebel insurgents, authorities as well as militias. In response, the state conducts further violence in pursuit of so-called justice such as arbitrary detentions, raids, and military security check-points. Documented

1. Krue Se mosque standoff – 28 April 2004, 32 gunmen took shelter in the mosque, after more than 100 militants carried out attacks on 10 police outposts across Pattani, Yala, and Songkhla Provinces. After a 7-hour standoff, the army raided the mosque that left 32 insurgents and 3 security officers dead. According to HRW, investigations have yest to be conducted on the incident

2. Tak Bai massacre – 25 October 2004, a demonstration of around 1,500 people gathered in front of a police station in Tak Bai to protest the detention of six men. Several hours into the protest, the crowd attempted to cross the police barrier into the station. Police responded with tear gas and water cannons, and the crowd responded by throwing rocks. Police fired into the air and then into the crowd, killing seven. According to media reports, the detained protestors were ordered to strip to the waist, lie on their stomachs, and crawl to nearby trucks that would transport them to another site, they were then stacked atop one another in trucks and transported to Inkayut Army Camp in Pattani Province. The drive took five hours, and by the time the trucks arrived at the destination, 78 detainees had died from suffocation or organ collapse.

reports have also exposed torture during detentions. (Amnesty International, 2009.) Arbitrary detention affects youths and their families albeit differently. Youths live in fear of being detained and families of detainees or former detainees live with stigma, discrimination and fear. For the young in general, there is an overwhelming sense of helplessness towards the future: most are unable to find any form of employment due to the stigma of being associated with ex-detainees, even though they were released due to no evidence. This has an immediate effect on other members of the household, especially wives or sisters. Women inadvertently have to take over the mantle as the family's breadwinner.

One of the under-explored impacts of the conflict is the effect on human migration. According to a study conducted in 2017, a direct consequence of the unrest is the increased migration both within Thailand and to Malaysia. This migration is not restricted to the Patani Muslim community, but it had also affected the Thai Buddhist community. Indiscriminate attacks on Thai Buddhists during the early 2000s, including teachers, hospital workers and Buddhist monks resulted in many leaving. (Girald, 2018)

However, the most heavily affected community are the Patani Muslims, who have had to bear the brunt of violence where two-thirds of the overall deaths due to the conflict are them. (Girard, 2018) This report will be focusing on the migration of the Patani Muslim community in particular youths. That the escalation of violence since 2004 has resulted in a significant increase of it and it is without doubt that as studies have shown, long-term instability and violence often bring about migration and produce significant displacement, both within and across national borders.

This map shows the extent of the violence and the numerous groups that have evolved over the years. What is prevalent is the permutations of the militia and insurgent groups.



Malaysia's economic growth over the years, stable politics and multiethnic composition have made it an attractive migrant destination especially from neighboring countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Middle East and African countries. The majority come to Malaysia to seek economic opportunities, while a substantial number of irregular and vulnerable migrants come to Malaysia seeking protection from violence, persecution and violations from their home country (IOM, 2021). Between 2010 and 2017, the number of documented or regular foreign workers in Malaysia increased from 1.7 million to 2.2 million. (IOM, 2021) Majority of foreign workers in Malaysia come from Indonesia followed by South Asia - Nepal and Bangladesh, Philippines and Myanmar. (Loh, Simler, Tan, & Yi, 2019).

The figures below depict the features of foreign workers by nationality and gender.

Indonesia make up the largest group
(number of foreign workers by country of origin)



The majority of foreign workers are males
(share of foreign workers by gender 2016)



Source Knowledge & Research. Who is Keeping Score?
Estimating the Number of Foreign Workers in Malaysia. April 2020.

The inflow of foreign workers has been rising over the years, according to the Labor Force surveys by the Department of Statistics (DOSM), the foreign workforce makes up around 15 percent of the total labor force (Loh, Simler, Tan, & Yi, 2019). Malaysia relies heavily on foreign labor to address the labor market imbalance by filling in for the shortage in low-skilled, labor intensive sectors. The continuous influx of low-skilled foreign laborers helps Malaysia to maintain its competitiveness of labor-intensive goods by maintaining low wages for low-skilled labor.

Percentage of foreign migrant workers by sector



Source Knowledge & Research. Who is Keeping Score?
Estimating the Number of Foreign Workers in Malaysia. April 2020.

Migrant workers or also known as "foreign workers" in this report refer to foreign individuals who lawfully entered Malaysia for low-skilled jobs under the Visit Pass (Temporary Employment, VP(TE)) system. This is done by securing the job before coming to Malaysia which is usually done through employment agencies used by employers. According to the 2019 world bank report, foreign workers usually earn around MYR1,100 per month (approximately US$266). Foreign workers exclude high-skilled foreigners who come in under the Employment pass. Migrant workers in general are usually prime age adults, in Malaysia where there is an age cap for migrant workers that puts the population within the age of 18 - 45 years old but safe to say most are below 35 years old.

5.1 Types of Migrants

In reference to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) definitions, regular migration is when one who migrates is in compliance with the laws of the country of origin, transit and destination. While there is no universal definition of what constitutes irregular migration, again according to the IOM, it is "... the movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination".[3] Based on this we can broadly group irregular migrants into four categories (Loh, Simler, Tan, & Yi, 2019):

1. **Illegal entries** - who fail to produce a valid official passport or any other form of legal travel document upon entering Malaysia.
2. **Persons not authorized to work** - who entered Malaysia through legal channels but do not have a valid work permit.
3. **Overstayers** - Those who have a legal right to work in Malaysia but do not leave the country after the expiry date or cancellation of their VP(TE) pass.
4. **Refugees and asylum seekers** - who have no legal status in Malaysia but seek employment.

Table 1: Foreign worker estimates and associated definitions (2017)

AGENCY	Estimates	Definition
MOHA	1.797 million	Foreign workers to whom a VP(TE) issued for the given year (VP subject to an annual renewal) (so-called 'registered' foreign workers)
LFS (DOSM)	2.27 million	Non-citizen labour force, including irregular foreign workers but excluding tourists or foreign workers who do not reside in households (for example, hostels, labour camps).
Population and Demography (DOSM)	3.287 million (estimate of 2018 based on the 2020 census)	People who are not born in Malaysia including children, students, spouses of Malaysian citizens, and expatriates and their dependents.

Source: Report No: AUS0000681 Malaysia - Estimating the Number of Foreign Workers (A report from the Labor Market Data for Monetary Policy task)

5.2 Irregular Migrants

It is difficult to get precise and accurate figures on irregular migrants due to the limited ability in tracking them, which is why there are no definitive official numbers of them in the country. However, based on the World Bank report, it is safe to say that the numbers are substantial. It is believed that irregular migrants outnumber regular migrants. Based on enforcement operations by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), it is reported that 4 out of 10 foreign workers are irregular. It is therefore suggesting that in 2017 the number of irregular workers stand at around 1.2 million while the total foreign workers are about 3 million but unofficial data suggest that there are as many as four million irregular migrant workers (Loh, Simler, Tan, & Yi, 2019). It must be advised that the data on irregular migrant workers is based on the Immigration's Department's enforcement activities which could have errors owing to selection bias.

Again, according to data from the Immigration Department, irregular migrant workers tend to be from Indonesia due to geographical proximity, porous borders as well as Malaysia's economic stability. The World Bank had explored possible alternative ways to track the flow of irregular migrant workers, such as those arriving as tourists, entering the country legally but working illegally. The net arrival of non-resident tourists by nationality provides information flows for tourists who do not depart but stay in Malaysia.

This encourages the assumption of them working in Malaysia as irregular migrant workers. By law tourists from ASEAN countries are permitted to stay in Malaysia for 30 days without tourist visas. If we look at the number of annual tourists from 2013 -2017, the biggest numbers are Indonesia suggesting that there are repeated travels within a year. Being so geographically near, moving in and out of the country to renew a 30-day tourist visa would not be a challenge, especially if border immigration points are landed or by sea where immigration points tend to be less rigorous.

5.3 Thai Migrants Workers Inflow into Malaysia

According to the Home Minister, while answering questions in Parliament, the number of foreign migrant workers from Thailand in 2017 to be approximately 12,603 (Nasa, New Straits Time, 2017). However, according to the Thai Consul-General in Kota Bharu, Kelantan, there are 38,487 Thai workers working legally in Malaysia while around 30,000 are working illegally (Bangkok Post, 2021). According to Mr. Jazmi Abdullah, ex-president of the Tom Yam Association Malaysia (PERTOM), there are about 1,000 Tom Yam restaurants registered under PERTOM in Peninsular Malaysia employing around 10,000 workers from Southern Thailand. However, since the COVID-19 outbreak and subsequent economic impact, Thai workers who returned home amount to 19,000 while those who remain are about 30,000 (Bangkok Post, 2021). The reasons for the return have been due to the Movement Control Order (MCO) or lockdowns which have forced many restaurants to either downsize or close down and the weakening of the ringgit (Bangkok Post, 2021).

Another interesting and strong assumption of high numbers of irregular migrant workers from Thailand is based on tourist arrival to Malaysia. The numbers of Thai tourists have been steadily increasing since 2015, maintaining at around 1.7 million yearly since. This

3. In reference to the definitions as per https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms as accessed in February 2021.

suggests that there are repeated travels to Malaysia. Due to the geographical proximity of Thailand and Malaysia and the ease of land border crossing, it would not be impossible for Thai irregular migrant workers to work in Malaysia, entering using tourist visas, especially in the northern states where they can easily return to Thailand for visa runs every month. Unfortunately, these numbers are not easily available and this assumption is made based on the World Bank report that suggests the steady high number of Indonesian tourists suggest the same. (World Bank, 2020).

It is worth noting that the official number of Thai migrant workers in Malaysia is not high compared to those coming from Indonesia, Bangladesh, Nepal and even Myanmar. However, there is evidence to show that there is a significant number of irregular migrant workers that have been growing over the past 10 years but unfortunately, the current data does not give the full picture of the community of Thai migrant workers in Malaysia, in particular those from the Southern provinces.

Selangor Mansion Flat, Kuala Lumpur

There is strong evidence to suggest that there is a high number of youths from the Deep South migrating to Malaysia to look for employment as well as refuge, due to the lack of economic opportunity, violence and the targeting of young men. Current literature predominantly mentions migration due to economic reasons only, hardly mentioning the impact of the violence. However, this has started to change. This paper will contribute to the literature on the reasons for the migration to be more than just for economic pursuit.

Among the Patani community, especially those who have experienced violence or have a family member or relations detained by the military, there is overall high distrust towards authorities including health institutions. The young in general, have an overwhelming feeling of helplessness towards the future: most are unable to find any form of employment and the continued violence since 2004 has had a negative effect.

The current perception based on official figures also argues that the Thai migrant community in Malaysia is unsubstantial and the limited data on irregular migrants from Thailand does not give a complete picture of the community. This landscape analysis hope to provide three key information:

1. Provide a multi-faceted overview of the Patani migrant community in Malaysia;
2. Identify the effects of the violence since 2004 on the Patani youths in Malaysia;
3. Identify strengths and challenges that are meaningful from the perspective of the Patani community.

The study used mix method approach both quantitative and qualitative:

Qualitative

Interviews

A diverse cohort of more than 17 representatives from the Patani community residing in Malaysia which includes youths working in Malaysia and eight representatives from NGOs, academics from research institutions and experts on the Southern Thai conflict both in Malaysia and Thailand. Questions were formulated based on the extensive literature review and desk research conducted.

Literature review

More than 70 essential academic journals, reports, policy briefs and news coverage pertaining to the Southern Thai conflict, the impact of the on-going violence on the community and peacebuilding initiatives were reviewed.

Desk research

Intensive desk research yielded complementary information about additional stakeholders who work in the area of Southern Thai conflict as well as their priorities, and programs.

Quantitative:

The Communities Advancing Resilience Toolkit (CART) Assessment Survey.

The CART toolkit has been recognized as an important community tool to assist communities in assessing their resilience to disasters and other adversities, in this case conflict. The CART survey can also obtain baseline information about a community, to identify relative community strengths and challenges, and to re-examine a community after a disaster or post intervention. Therefore, the project conducted this survey both in Malaysia as the destination country as well as in the Deep South. The respondent inclusion criteria for both locations are the same; youths aged between 18 to 35 years old and an equal number of both male and female. The current CART survey instrument consists of 25 core community resilience items along with demographics of respondents. The survey was administered in person and 45 people participated.

8.1 Migration as a Form of Flight

The migration of the Patani-Muslims from the Deep South to Malaysia is nothing new, it has been going on for centuries. The ties between the Deep South and Malaysia's most northern and east coast states run deep – sharing similar culture, linguistic and religion. The border between Malaysia and Thailand is long and porous, allowing the fluidity of human movement between the two countries to take place easily. According to Funstan, there are as many as 300,000 Patani-Muslims residing in Malaysia (Barter, 2014). This number is way more than any official number but what it does imply is the magnitude of how Patani-Muslims have assimilated and integrated within Malaysian society over the years.

The pattern of conflict migration from the Deep South to Kelantan can be traced as far back as the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 when thousands fled to Malaya. It was also the response during the Phibun's Thaification policies in the early 1940s (Barter, 2014). After Haji Sulong's arrest and subsequent disappearance that led to clashes in 1955, thousands again fled to Malaya. This repeated again in the 1970s when violence grew but started to decrease in the late 1980s as the violence de-escalated. However, this resumed once more with renewed violence after 2004.

Therefore, it is safe to say that migration has become a form of survival strategy – flight due to the conflict. This paper identifies three types of migration as a form of flight; they are migrant workers, students and those seeking refuge from persecution. However, a fourth is more gender specific, the rise of female migrant workers.

8.1.1 Migrat Workers - Irragular Migrant Workers

There is limited information on international migration from the southernmost provinces, where young people have commonly moved to work in unskilled jobs in Malaysia for several decades. However, according to the Minority Reports paper 2018, estimates suggest that it is likely that at least 20 percent of the working-age population of the southern provinces live or work in Malaysia. In another study, published in 2006, focusing on a community in Narathiwat, 70 percent had family members who had worked in Malaysia and almost 20 percent had at least one family member married to a Malaysian national (Girard, 2018). The general consensus is that until the recent COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent travel restrictions, migration to Malaysia was not only increasing, but also – particularly for women – taking on a more permanent character.

Internal migration within Thailand for economic reasons is not uncommon, what makes the migration of Patani-Muslims stand out is that while others migrate to the big cities within Thailand such as Bangkok, Patani-Muslims cross the border to work in Malaysia instead. A key reason that is usually cited is the socio-linguistic proximity and Malaysia's economic growth. Little is mentioned that a majority who work in Malaysia are unskilled irregular migrants. Meaning, they do not have access to social security or insurance and are paid less than the average regular migrants who are legal, and are exposed to abuse by authorities. Yet, even with these challenges they prefer to come to Malaysia.

Another common assumption is that Patani-Muslims who are unskilled do not speak proficient Thai, and as a result they prefer to come to Peninsular Malaysia. It must be noted that the Malay dialect spoken in Southern Thai is phonetically similar but not the same as Kelantan. This does not make it easier for them to integrate in other parts of Peninsular Malaysia. Hence, this reason is rather weak. For example, when interviewing respondents for this report, all respondents preferred to fill questionnaires written in Thai rather than Malay when given the choice. On occasion, a Thai-speaking interpreter was needed for fluidity.

It is assumed that the majority of irregular Patani-Muslim workers work within the service sector – the food and beverage industry, in particularly the Tom Yam restaurants that have been flourishing over the past three decades. The first Thai restaurant in Kuala Lumpur was established in the 1970s, which was a small family-run restaurant (Bunmak, 2019). Today, these restaurants can be found everywhere in Peninsular Malaysia, particularly in urban areas (but not exclusively). Unofficial figures put the number of Tom Yam restaurants in Malaysia in the thousands. Those registered and members of the Tom Yam entrepreneur's association also known as PERTOM alone number to 1000.[4] The Tom Yam restaurants represent comfort food that is uniquely Thai and affordable. Ironically though, the owners of a majority of these restaurants are Patani-Muslims who have migrated here yet the food they sell are uniquely Thai dishes.

Before coming to Malaysia, a would-be migrant would have engaged the loose yet important Patani migrant social network that has strong and wide links in Malaysia. This is essential, for it would link a potential migrant to employment directly. It would be impossible or at least difficult and risky not to access this network. This is supported by Mr. Jazmi[5] who stresses that the safety and ability to find employment within this industry relies on the network. According to him, the network is not structured, it is a loose entity that relies on "introduction" as a form of ensuring the person who is coming is not a criminal and can be relied on. A worker can easily move between jobs within the industry but reputation does matter since most workers are considered working in Malaysia illegally.

4. Interview with Mr. Jazmi Abdullah, ex- deputy president of the Association of Tomyam restaurant owners. Persatuan Pengusaha Tomyam Malaysia (PERTOM) is an official organization whose Patron is Dato' Seri Muhamad Nazri bin Tan Sri Abdul Aziz, a member of parliament from UMNO and previously the Minister of Tourism Malaysia. http://pertom03.blogspot.com/
5. Interview with Mr. Jazmi Abdullah, ex- deputy president of the Association of Tomyam restaurant owners.

However, it must be noted that there is also a growing number of professional Patani-Muslim workers in Kuala Lumpur and Penang, albeit a small one. Based on the interviews conducted for this paper, due to the expanding Information Technology (IT) industry here in Malaysia, the need for content in Thai language and the Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) within ASEAN have made it easier for skilled workforce to move within ASEAN countries. This has benefitted the more skilled Patani-Muslims workforce in seeking jobs outside. Out of the 17 youth interviewed for this paper, 5 work in the IT industry. All 5 are graduates from National Universities in Southern Thailand.

According to our interviewees, five years ago it would be difficult to meet a Patani-Muslims working in the IT industry here, but today, in Bangsar South alone there are 40 Patani-Muslims professionals working within a number of IT companies based there. They are considered high-skilled workers, are under the employment pass (EP) and are termed Expatriates and have all the rights that come with an EP.

However, many do not bring their families but rather return home to visit every two weeks. The bus and train system connectivity between Kuala Lumpur, Penang and Thailand make it very convenient for this routine. One interviewee said that at least twice a month, on Fridays after work he will take the night bus to Kelantan, at the border crossing he grabs a taxi and he's home for Saturday breakfast with the family. On Sunday night he returns to Kuala Lumpur and enters office by 9 am Monday. By not bringing their families over they are able to save more money. It must also be noted that many do not want to reside permanently in Malaysia but wish to eventually return home. This routine is also taken by irregular migrant workers, allowing their presence of illegally working in Malaysia go undetected since they regularly renew their tourist visa at the border.

8.1.2 Female Migration

According to international reports, there is a global rise in the number of women migrating to pursue opportunities abroad. Women now constitute over half of the 244 million migrants who live and work globally (Hennebry, 2016). Women are not passive actors in migration processes. They are increasingly being recognised as equally important as any other migrant group. They also contribute significantly to local and community development in countries of origin and destination. Women migration has been linked to poverty reduction, an increase in entrepreneurship, and to economic and social development in both countries (Hennebry, 2016).

Therefore it should not be a surprise that among those migrating to Malaysia include *young unmarried women* in search for long-term work in the service sector (Tsuneda, 2006). It should be noted that the female migrant workers population in Malaysia is significant, albeit not as many as the men specifically from Thailand. Patani-Muslim women migration to Malaysia can be traced from the 1980s when women started coming to work as domestic help in the northern and east coast states. However, today many work in factories or the Tom Yam restaurants. It is presumed that the increase in female migration is a result of increased responsibility of female family members to become the main breadwinner. The need to help families back home financially, especially when male family members cannot work due to being detained, blacklisted or unwell.

Due to the fluidity of movement of both irregular and professional workers returning back and forth between Southern Thailand and Malaysia, there is no need for remittance transfer via banks. According to interviews, most prefer to exchange money to Baht once they arrive in Southern Thailand rather than do bank transfers. It is safe, cheap and at better rates. Hence, there is very little evidence of remittance between Patani-Muslims workers in Malaysia to Thailand.

8.1.3 Student Migration

Through religion in particular, education played an important element in the proximity of the Patani region and Kelantan, Malaysia. According to Arba'iyah Mohamd Noor in her paper entitled The Development of Islamic Education in Kelantan, many Patani religious scholars came to Kelantan to teach as well as help to build the religious schools or *Pondok* since the early 19th century. Patani *Ulama* or *Tok Guru* were instrumental in building the Islamic education system within Kelantan until its heyday in the mid 20th century. However, this started to change by the late 1980s, as *pondok* schools' popularity in Malaysia started to decline and private Islamic schools became more popular. Nevertheless, *pondok* schools are still popular in the Patani region. Two out of the six respondents whom IMAN interviewed in Kelantan are currently studying in a recognized *pondok* school.

The direct result of Thaksin's declaration of "war on terror" in 2004 was the targeting of *pondok* schools by the government and came under military's suspicion, in particular 10 schools that were singled out as harboring militants. Schools were raided, students and teachers were lined-up, questioned and finger-printed even though there was no evidence. A number of teachers and headmasters were taken in for questioning and four teachers Ustaz were arrested for bombings (Porath, 2014). Many threats were made against *pondok* schools as being subversive and anti-Thai. Thaksin's government made numerous threats to close down pondok schools unless they all agreed to toe the line. Teachers and students who were accused, went on the run. They felt threatened and did not trust the Thai legal system would protect them if they turned themselves in. Therefore, many fled to Malaysia for refuge. Some students were able to continue studying while working but others joined the ranks of irregular

migrants. Out of the six respondents interviewed in Kelantan, two were students when they fled while one person was a teacher. All three who entered Malaysia illegally are now irregular workers in Kelantan working odd jobs and have not returned home since.

Today, there is still a sizable number of Patani-Muslims students coming to study in Malaysia, but mostly are in higher education and/or in private religious schools that provide a mix of religious and secular education. Among tertiary institutions that have a sizable number of Patani students are the Sultan Ismail Petra International Islamic College (KIAS) in Kelantan, Northern University Malaysia (UUM) in Chanlung, Kedah and the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). Religious boarding schools catering for Patani-Muslims children such as Sekolah Maahad Muhammadi in Kota Bharu were once popular among Patani families. There is also a religious boarding school catering to Patani-Muslims children connected to the insurgency based in Kuala Lumpur (John, 2017).

8.1.4 Seeking Refuge from Persecution

As mentioned in the previous section, the escalation of violence that took place between 2004 to 2010 had many consequences among them being the fertile recruiting ground for the insurgency. Patani-Muslims have long felt neglected and marginalized by successive Bangkok governments, a sense reinforced by clumsy attempts at forced assimilation. Some have fled their homeland due to being wanted by Thai security forces for suspected involvement in the insurgency (Girard, 2018).

Being blacklisted is a danger for young men in the Deep South. Accused of crimes with or without evidence and having their photos posted on wanted banners throughout the Deep South causes fear for the individual and their families. Due to troubled history it is only natural that many Patani-Muslims do not trust authorities in general and the military in specific. As a result, Malaysia serves as an accessible location beyond the grasp of the Thai authorities. For this paper, we had interviewed 4 respondents who were on the run from Thailand due to being blacklisted by the authorities and their distrust towards the authorities and the legal system were the reasons for them fleeing. While strongly asserting their innocence, they do not believe they would receive fair treatment if they turned themselves in.

In 2013 the Thai government announced its *Bring People Home project*, a potential amnesty programme for accused insurgents. The project seeks out those who have joined or have been accused of taking part in the insurgency to surrender themselves to authorities, ensuring them of fairness as well as access to legal assistance. In 2017, 288 insurgents facing arrest warrants joined the programme while another 161 have shown interest (Bangkok Post, 2018).

Bangkok still needs to win more trust and local buy-in for this programme to succeed. For the moment, though, many suspected insurgents still live in Malaysia without access to documentation and its subsequent benefits and protection. Those who were interviewed had never requested asylum either with the Malaysian government or registered with UNHCR. They live within the village area they reside in, in Kelantan and do not venture further due to risk of being detained by Malaysian authorities for not having legal documentation.

8.2 The Military Operations and Impact Towards the Community

It is understood that the conflict between the Deep South and the state goes back centuries, even before the establishment of what we know today as Thailand. However, for this report, the focus of the violence is the re-emergence and escalation of violence after the 2004 incident, how it has affected the local community especially the deficit in trust and hope as well as pushed youths to leave.

8.2.1 Unrest or Armed Conflict?

The removal of Thaksin via a military coup in 2006 did not de-escalate the situation in the Deep South. The narrative pushed by Bangkok was this is the fault of radical Islamism, even as far as linking the insurgents to international militant/terrorist organisations even though no evidence supports this. By looking at the Deep South situation from a religious angle, avoiding addressing root causes such as the political issues of nation and state building in the region, the failures of the Thai polity to cope with democratization and the web of corruption and criminality that has grown so significantly, the situation will never be resolved. (Melvin N. , 2007)

This "slow burning" conflict will eventually drain the energy of local communities and state financial resources, and further increase the chance of a full blown armed conflict. The Thai government continues to downplay the severity of the situation by terming it as unrest. Further aggravating local frustration, distrust and anger towards the states. Alienating the Patani-Muslims community further and strengthening the narratives of the insurgents.

It is worth noting that Thai modern history has experienced much political upheaval and at times with violent repercussions. Since 1946, with the crowning of King Bhumibol Adulyadej, Thailand has had 10 successful coups, the most recent being 2014 and 17 constitutions. A communist insurgency between 1965 – 1983, became a forward base of the U.S. military during the Vietnam War and border conflict with Cambodia, to name a few. Thailand is also home to the largest number of asylum seekers and refugees in the region, absorbing the influx of refugees from the ethnic-oriented conflicts in Myanmar (Humanity & Inclusion, n.d.)

It is safe to say that Thailand faces many challenges both internal and external. It is a country that is politically and socially divided where tensions run high, coupled further with the widening inequality gap (Yang, 2019). There are also striking contrasts between the people of Bangkok and the rest of the country.

All these combined amount to the matrix of frustration amongst the present-day young generations with little prospects of freedom and liberty, bolder and daring manifestation of defiance against the military junta and the monarchy.

8.2.2 Thaksin Policies and Tak Bai Tragedy

Two events that altered the dynamics of the Deep South conflict for the last one decade was the Tak Bai massacre that occurred in October 2004 (Human Rights Watch, 2014). It is also important to note that there was another violent incident just a few months earlier, during the fasting month of Ramadhan. Soldiers stormed their way into the Krue Se mosque killing 30 suspected insurgents – this incident is known as the Krue Se stand-off. When these two massacres took place, Thaksin Shinawatra was a popular Prime Minister, a former police officer turned businessman turned politician who took the war on drugs as a matter of personal key performance indicator. During the first 3 months of his war on drugs campaign, 2,800 extra judicial killings happened, more than half had no connection with drugs.(Human Rights Watch, 2008)

Respondents interviewed for this report mostly mentioned that the Tak Bai massacre was still present in their psyche and had influenced their life decisions. While none of our respondents experienced the direct impact of the event, all believe that it was the beginning of a quid pro quo scenario in terms of military offensive and counter insurgency. Being part of the Patani-Muslims community, all the respondents experienced second-hand violence post Tak Bai.

Pertubuhan Jaringan Cakna Warisan Nusantara (PENJANA), a non-profit organisation that promotes the history, culture and heritage of the Malay Nusantara region with an emphasis on the Patani-Muslims based in Kelantan, have over the years worked and helped those who fled post Tak Bai. PENJANA regularly organises youth summer camps, seminars and talks together with their counterparts in the Deep South for Patani-Muslims communities in both countries. According to Benyamin Hamdi, Chairman of PENJANA, post 2004 saw a rise of mostly undocumented migration from Pattani which he believes is the direct result of the Tak Bai massacre. "Hijrah'', the term used to refer to the migration, was much higher during the initial period post Tak Bai. The majority who migrated were in their twenties but it included some older people too.

They initially came on their own but they were later joined by their wives and children. Many who were single also ended up settling in Kelantan. Challenges faced by this community rises directly from them being undocumented and therefore having no access to social security and healthcare. Their children are now entering their teenage years and are also facing similar problems but with no formal access to education. Some of the local private religious schools allow enrollment but their education is hampered by not being able to take official exams and receiving valid educa-

tional certificates.

8.2.3 Military Impunity

For decades, the Thai government has been able to moderate the conflict in the Deep South with little condemnation or pressure both within the country as well internationally. Thailand's successive governments have been known to downplay the conflict in the Deep South. Yet, the media highlights on military activities and insurgent's guerrilla warfare show otherwise. Despite several administration changes after the 2006 coup, the military has had uninterrupted control in the Deep South, from the purchase of military hardware to designing the military zones, all with the agreement of provincial governments (Knoema, n.d.).

The Deep South, due to its, distance from Bangkok as well as the notoriety of the region within the Bangkok elite, has allowed the military to function almost independently and with little oversight especially those within the special taskforce. (Amnesty International, 2016)

When an attack occurs in one of the many hotspots marked by the military, the military would quickly form a task force to look for suspects. Often they would catch individuals who are already on their list. Those caught often end up being detained for years pending trial while those who resist the interrogation process end up dead (Ahmad & Ismail, News: Thai News, 2019). There has been strong and consistent allegations by NGOs of abuse of power and torture committed by the military especially during detention. According to Amnesty International, the military uses tactics that contravene human rights to extract confessions.(Palatino, 2016). The violation is not limited to suspected insurgents but includes activists. The case of Somchai Neelapaijit[6], a human rights lawyer who defended five Muslim supects allegedly involved in an army camp raid in Narathiwat in January 2004 is an example. To add, the disappearance of Haji Sulong in 1954[7], is still within the community's psyche until today. Activists and civil society organizations have been documenting and publishing data on incidents of violence that took place especially post 2004.

Today, at military checkpoints in the Deep South, blurry screenshot photos of local people suspected of being involved in the insurgency adorn the side walls of the checkpoints. Road users are reminded openly through the display of the faces of "wanted persons" every time they use the road.

6. Somchai Neelapaijit disappeared on 12 March 2004, one day after he had publicly accused the police of torturing his clients, who were in detention in the South of Thailand. Since then, nothing has been heard of him. (https://lawyersforlawyers.org/en/17-years-since-disappearance-somchai-neelapaijit/)
7.Chairman of the Pattani Provincial Islamic Council. In 1947 Haji Sulong led a petition campaign for autonomy, language and cultural rights, and implementation of Islamic law. The nationalist military government of Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram reacted by arresting Haji Sulong together with several other religious leaders and Muslim parliamentarians on treason charges in January 1948. (https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/thailand0307/3.htm)

8.3 Conflict and Impact on Mental Health

Literature has informed us that exposure to traumatic events has been found to increase risk of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as well as depression and other mental disorders (Axinn, Ghirmire, Williams, & Scott, 2013; Miller & Rasmussen, 2010). In addition to stress due to direct exposure to conflict, everyday tensions related to the conflict such as economic depression and migration of family members may increase the level of mental health symptoms which includes depression, anxiety and other issues (Miller & Rasmussen, 2010).

8.3.1 Impact on Household and Communities Left Behind

In a study conducted by Kathleen Ford, Aree Jampaklay, and Aphichat Chamratrithirong on mental health in the conflict areas of Southern Thailand, direct exposure to conflict affects mental health but coupled with economic hardship and migration has resulted in psychiatric symptoms among adults (Ford, 2017). The study further explained that symptoms of mental illness were reported by persons living in villages with higher levels of migration as well as from households with a current migrant. The experience of losing a household member to migration increased the reporting of symptoms of mental health, regardless of the remittances received. The study also noted that at the village level, the effects were stronger among the women and this suggests that women's lives may be more affected by the absence of community members.

One of the key requests from 2 local non-governmental organisations in Pattani who contributed to this report are tools and training on counselling and mental health intervention also known locally as trauma healing.[8] While the whole community is affected by the violence, each demographic; children, women, youths and the elderly are all suffering but handling it differently. Due to the methods employed by the military to "hunt-down" insurgents' examples such as targeting of schools and preschools, teachers and so forth, this not only intensifies distrust but also causes traumatic events. Children and people are left feeling frightened, helpless and constantly on edge.

8.3.2 Impact on Those Leaving/Fleeing

We know that refugees who have fled from war zones are more at risk for post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) and other trauma-related disorders, which may lead to dysfunctional behaviours that impair their ability to cope with social and/or family life. Based on the interviews that were conducted for this study, with the exception of one, all respondents showed signs of anxiety and stress when talking about the violence.

This is not surprising since they all had experienced at least second-hand violence. Most had heard shootings and bombings occurring though they were not near enough to be hurt. Six out of the 17 youths had friends or family members arbitrarily detained and one had a friend found dead in the river after having gone missing. Apart from economic reasons, the men left to work in Malaysia to avoid being arbitrarily detained and two of those interviewed are waiting to reach an age which will be safe for them to return and work back in Patani – they will then be no longer within the age group considered "battle ready" (Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD), 2015).

Coming to work in Malaysia as irregular migrants has many disadvantages, as mentioned before: lack of access to social security and healthcare makes life precarious, the low wages and long working hours affect health and those working in construction sites are exposed to injury sans insurance. Those without any form of documents are always wary of being detained by Malaysian authorities who on a good day can ask for financial compensation for release or worse, deportation. Deportation for those who are blacklisted in Pattani would be disastrous. All these worries can build anxiety and stress and in the long run can result in mental health issues.

Those who are on the run in Malaysia may have experienced traumatic events personally while in Pattani or while running to Malaysia. Many of them have not engaged in any form of counselling. 2 respondents who shared their experience running to Malaysia, one, an ex-student who was injured during a clash with authorities while demonstrating against the Tak Bai massacre had his eyes damaged due to an exploding gas canister. He fled to Malaysia because his family believed he may be detained if he stayed in Patani. However, since being in Malaysia he has had difficulty getting treatment for his damaged eyesight (he has been diagnosed as blind) and has not received any assistance in terms of skills or education and lives at the mercy of extended families and local community. Another respondent was a former teacher who fled as he was listed as a bomb suspect which he vehemently denies. He believed his colleague who was tortured by the military gave his name under duress. His family advised him to flee immediately to avoid being detained and tortured. As a result, he divorced his wife to protect her and his child whom he has not seen in 5 years.

8. Civil Society Assembly Peace (CAP) and Dua Jai (Hearty Support) Group

8.4 Impact on Women

Undeniably, Patani-Muslim men are the primary targets of the operations carried out by the military forces in Southern Thailand due to the perception as being "battle-ready", leading to their exodus towards Malaysia, as discussed elsewhere in this work. However, not only do women in the region suffer direct violence - as they are collateral damage caught in the midst of the persisting conflict – but their identity as women in situations of conflict subject them to unique, long-term implications. As put by Marddent, women have been "killed, injured, traumatized, sexually harassed, and have experienced emotional and economic suffering as the conflict persisted." (Marddent, 2019, p. 225). These direct and indirect violence will be explored in this section.

8.4.1 Women Suffering the Collateral Damage/Soft Targets of Shooting and Bombings (Direct Violance)

Shooting and bombings in Southern Thailand have killed and injured thousands of women. A report from the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC) shows an overwhelming number of women, were soft targets - victimized by the conflict, with 513 killed and 1,704 injured as a result of shootings or bombings from the year 2004 to 2017 (Marddent, 2019, p. 229). Sources in 2018 place the figure of victimized women at around 16% of the around 20,000 people killed and injured in this violence (Ahmad & Ismail, News: Thai News, 2018).

This is increasingly worrying as recent trends seem to demonstrate that some attacks in the region specifically target women (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Even when that is not the case, women end up constituting large chunks of the victims as seen on the May 9th 2017 bombing attack on Big C in Pattani, which caused injuries to 43 women.[9] Moreover, schools and hospitals remain targets of the violence. Between 2004 to 2015, there were 315 security-cases of arson on schools: 81 in Yala, 134 in Pattani, 83 in Narathiwat and 17 in Songkhla; whereas between 2004 and 2016 there were 32 attacks on hospitals and healthcare services centres in the Deep South.[10]

This demonstrates principles of conflict – which prohibit attacks on schools, hospitals, women, and children - are not adhered to. Furthermore, all efforts to cordon off areas of the Deep South as safety zones have proved unsuccessful. Therefore, it seems women will continue to be innocent casualties of this violence as long as it persists.

8.4.2 Women Suffering Forms of Gender-Based Violence (GVB) Caused, or Aggravated by the Conflict

Due partly to the patriarchal nature of society, women are often targeted and subjected to violence as a result of their perceived affiliations with members of the insurgency. Women's rights activists in the region organize events to educate women of their legal rights, as military and police forces often visit the surviving family members of insurgents as a form of state intimidation (Quinley, Asia: Thailand, 2020). Harassment at the arms of officials also manifests in more severe forms. As pointed out in their submission to the United Nations Committee on The Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Cross-Cultural Foundation (CrCF) and other Local Civil Society Organizations identified that martial law has been used to subject women to arbitrary arrest, detention, and interrogation.[11]

Allegations of rape by police officers in the Southern Border Provinces, as well as incidents of sexual harassment by officials at checkpoints in the area are commonplace (International Commission of Jurists, 2012). This was also mentioned by our interview respondents. Additionally, domestic violence is a prevalent issue in Thailand, where 1 in 6 women in heterosexual relationships suffer domestic violence (Chuemchit, Chernkwanma, Somrongthong, & Spitzer, 2018). It can be deduced that this situation is exacerbated by the ongoing conflict in the Deep South, as studies demonstrate that domestic violence increases in situations of conflict, making these women particularly vulnerable to abuse from many different perpetrators (Cohen, Green, & Wood, 2013). Perhaps most troubling of all, the failings of the justice system to adequately address rape and sexual harassment afford perpetrators impunity, as there is a lack of a proper framework to prevent, investigate and prosecute gender-based violence (International Commission of Jurists, 2012).

8.4.3 The "Double Burden" That Women Assume as a Result of Losing the Breadwinners of Their Family. (Indirect Violence)

This term, coined by a Mekong Institute Working Paper (Sukka, 2014); describes both (a) the assumption of financial as well as domestic obligations due to the loss of breadwinners and (b) the dual duty on matrilineal relatives of Muslim female breadwinners - since mothers, sisters or their female siblings are heavily relied on by these currently single mothers - to provide for both their family and the family of their struggling relative. This double burden is only deepened by the discrimination women still face in the economic realm.

9. United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 6th Session, Recommendations of the Cross Cultural Foundation (CrCF) and other Local Civil Society Organizations (3-21st July 2017)
10. Ibid page 4
11. Ibid page 5

As set out in other parts of this research, the three regions that make up the Deep South have experienced no significant economic growth, and this is a huge reason why many continue to migrate out of the region. The perceived pull factors in the form of higher salaries for unskilled workers, ease of travel and cultural similarities between the regions have also been outlined above as reasons for why Malaysia receives a large number of Patani-Muslims migrant workers.

From this analysis, it is only natural that a large number Patani-Muslims women, who are thrust into the economic sphere as breadwinners without prior opportunity to acquire professional skills or higher education, would also decide to migrate to Malaysia to take up jobs as unskilled workers. In this situation, Malaysia is seemingly the best economic option.

While this may explain why a large number of Patani-Muslims women assuming unskilled jobs feel the need to migrate to Malaysia, interviews conducted by IMAN suggests that there is also a rising number of professional Patani-Muslims women who decide to take up jobs in respective fields in Malaysia, as opposed to Bangkok. This was reflected when two female respondents, who currently work as IT professionals in Malaysia after working at similar positions in Bangkok,expressed a clear preference for working in Malaysia - citing ease and comfort in expressing their faith here. This is a curious phenomenon, as Thai Muslim women and Patani-Muslims women are not distinguishable in their outward expression of faith - and this is even more so in the world of skilled workers, where all individuals emulate a certain professional identity.

It may then be inferred that of all the pull factors for migrant workers from the Deep South to migrate to Malaysia for economic opportunities, the comfort of not being discriminated against for their identity as Patani-Muslims - as opposed to religious beliefs per se - due to the cultural similarities in Malaysia is the strongest pull factor. Therefore, the term double burden may also extend to describing the dual discrimination borne by Patani-Muslims women in the economic domain, who face discrimination due to their gender and also due their identity as Patani-Muslims.

8.4.4 The Social Cost - Affecting the Relationship Between Patani-Muslim Men and Women?

Findings of interviews conducted by IMAN show some men in the region who have been involved in the secessionist movement may pursue divorce in order to protect women and children from being targets of the military by association. Anecdotal evidence suggests men may feel a sense of unhappiness and resentment that women are allowed to continue their lives with family in the region, whilst they may be forced to flee the region and their loved ones. The sense of Patani-Muslim identity unique to Southern Thailand may make leaving the region particularly difficult as well (Tsuneda M. , 2015).

The increase in the movement of people across the border when a major incident occurs does support the theory that migration is a flight strategy. Most studies refer to the root cause being economics but, looking at the situation in the Deep South today, economics and violence cannot be separated. The violence is causing the areas to suffer economically and threatening the communities livelihood and safety. There is also evidence that young men who have chosen to leave are doing so to avoid being detained or targeted. Moving to Malaysia is a pragmatic solution but not a permanent one. Based on IMAN's interviews, all want to return home and show no desire to permanently stay in Malaysia.

The social and economic impact of sustained violence in the Deep South needs to be examined further. The current government's policies are not easing the situation but instead perpetuating it. There is evidence of consistent acts of violence from arbitrary detention, random killing, bombing, military checkpoints etc. While the perpetrators range from military, rogue officers, militias to insurgents but the impact is the same, it is resulting in a community living in constant fear, anxiety and total distrust. This is without doubt affecting the communities wellbeing, particularly mental health which is even more impacted when losing family to migration. One serious concern is children growing up in this environment. There is currently a lack of studies on the impact of sustained violence on children in the Deep South, but based on data from other countries, children growing up in armed conflict suffer significantly. The disruption of family relations which is a critical foundation sees them suffering from stigma, discrimination and a pessimistic outlook of life and their future. This is a recipe for further disaster if not mitigated. While the direct violence is disproportionately affecting men, women nevertheless are affected. Women having to takeover the role of heads of household, migrating in search of employment and the rise of domestic violence are all a result of the violence.

It is without doubt that Malaysia and the Deep South have a close affinity. Being in Malaysia makes them feel safe and to a certain extent accepted albeit with limitations. The community wants to be seen and accepted as Patani-Muslims aka Malays and this is easier done in Malaysia. In Thailand there is too much baggage and stigma connotated with coming from the Deep South. Migrants moving to work in other countries with conflict scars is also another concern, the impact of second-hand violence still leaves deep emotional scars, if not treated will fester.

The Patani community, particularly the youths have been able to adapt and live in Malaysia even within the limitation of being either an irregular migrant or in exile, testament to their resiliency. Even though faced with multiple hazards such as lack of legal paperwork, limited social support and suffering from the effects of violence, they still thrive.

In trying to understand the community's resilience in terms of strength, needs and challenges, this study conducted a CART assessment survey. The Communities Advancing Resilience Toolkit (CART) is a theory-based and evidence-informed community intervention designed to enhance community resilience. By knowing where vulnerability and strength exist and how to bolster them, could help not only the Patani community but the immediate surrounding community. This is important since these two communities not only share common space but resources as well. To add, via the CART analysis, we can also better understand how the Patani community is coping or dealing with the psychological fallout from the violence back home.

The CART analysis found that the respondents perceived their main strength lies in their own sense of belonging – identifying themselves as Patani and knowing where they come from, their shared values, beliefs and culture gives them strength and a sense of pride. Despite the legal limitations here in Malaysia, the respondents feel connected to the Malaysian community that they live in and the interaction has contributed positively towards their own personal wellbeing. This is important for their ability to function and contribute is also tied to how they are perceived and accepted by the surrounding community beyond the Patani-Muslims. Supportive and nurturing communities can address the needs of diverse members (across a variety of age, ability, social and educational backgrounds) and they can instil hope during personal and community crises.

While the respondents perceived communal support as their strength, they see their ability to harness their collective resources as Patani-Muslims working and living in Malaysia as limited and their biggest challenge. A recent example would be during the first nation-wide Covid-19 lockdown in 2020, many Patani-Muslims had to reach out to NGOs back home in Thailand for assistance while some were able to receive help from local Malaysian NGOs for basic necessities.

Most of the irregular migrants and those in exile lack skills and education and have not been able to upgrade or improve themselves while here in Malaysia. The community network often referred to is an unofficial and loose Patani network and each location would have their own community leader. Most respondents believe that community leaders have not been able to collectively push an agenda that can help the community at either the individual, family or community level. Neither do they feel that they can rely on the network or their own community when they are facing crises whether it be financial, health etc. This is even more pronounced with those exiled who totally depend on extended family in Malaysia or the local community within the village they live in.

In conclusion, the CART results show that the Patani community in Malaysia do have resilience but it is limited. While most are independent, they become vulnerable when a crisis occurs. Whether it is a personal crisis such as falling sick or as a community. There are key areas where they need help such as skills building, training, health which includes mental health intervention. The network also has the potential to be strengthened to help and assist the community. The CART results can be useful for organisations that would like to invest in building further the resilience within the Patani-Muslim community in Malaysia.

Perceptions of community resilience are reflected by the 25 core community resilience item, 4 domain, and overall community resilience scores. Means and standard deviations for each of these community resilience scores are presented in Table 2. The Mean core community resilience item scores ranged from 2.73 to 3.82 (where 1 = very strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree).

Table 2: Core community resilience items by domains and perceptions of community resilience for the study sample.

Items	Domain/Overall Community Resilience	Mean* (SD)
	Connection and Caring	**3.66 (1.06)**
1	People in my community feel like they belong to the community.	3.75 (1.08)
2	People in my community are committed to the well-being of the community.	3.57 (1.09)
3	People in my community have hope about the future.	3.73 (1.09)
4	People in my community help each other.	3.82**
5	My community treats people fairly no matter what their background is.	3.44 (1.20)
	Resources	**3.10 (1.35)**
6	My community has the resources it needs to take care of community problems (resources include money, information, technology, tools, raw material & services).	3.11 (1.37)
7	My community has effective leaders.	2.84 (1.40)
8	People in my community are able to get the services they need.	3.25 (1.35)
9	People in my community know where to go get things done.	3.18 (1.31)
	Transformative Potential	**2.87 (1.24)**
10	My community works with organizations and agencies outside the community to get things done.	2.73***(1.34)
11	People in my community communicate with leaders who can help improve the community.	2.77 (1.25)
12	People in my community are awere of community issues that they might address together.	2.93 (1.21)
13	People in my community discuss issues so they can improve the community.	2.84 (1.22)
14	People in my community work together to improve the community.	3.11 (1.35)
15	My community looks at it successes and failures so it can learn from the past	2.93 (1.26)
16	My community develops skills and finds resources to solve its problem and reach its goals.	2.73**(1.19)
17	My community has priorities and sets goals for the future.	2.93 (1.176)
	Disaster Management	**2.80 (1.15)**
18	My community tries to prevent disasters.	2.93 (1.23)
19	My community actively prepares for future disasters.	2.80 (1.18)
20	My community can provide emergency services during a disaster.	3.29 (1.27)
21	My community has services and programs to help people after a disaster.	3.16 (1.22)
22	My community tries to prevent conflicts	3.27 (0.91)
23	My community actively prepares for possible conflicts.	2.96 (0.95)
24	My community can provide intervention to resolve/manage conflict.	2.80 (1.10)
25	My community has services and programmes to help people after a conflict.	2.78 (1.22)

In an interview with TRT World, security analyst, Don Pathan asserts that Islam and Malay are intertwined identities for the communities in the Deep South hence the government's attempts to eradicate the Malay identity makes them feel less Muslim (TRT World, 2020). However, despite this, it is often argued that conflicts in the region were not initially rooted in religious cleavages. It is understood that Islam only became a catalyst in insurgencies when the Thai government introduced integrationist policies which identified Patani-Muslims only as 'Thai Muslims', hence tagging them under the same umbrella with other Muslims in the country (Harish, 2006). It is this strong link to the Malay identity that ties the Patani-Muslim's affinity to Malaysia. This is further strengthened with cross-border linkages between Southern Thailand and Malaysia. The practice of dual-citizenship among border communities, working on the other side for better pay or sending children to Islamic schools in Malaysia for better quality education. (Hortsmann, 2002) According to a report, a large majority of Patani-Muslims in Narathiwat have family members who have worked in Malaysia whilst some have relatives married to Malaysians (Girard, 2018). Furthermore, Malaysia's role as a migrating destination becomes even more appealing with the increasing influence of political Islam in the country during the 1970s (Funston, 2010).

However, the relationship between Patani-Muslims and Malays in Malaysia today do not necessarily transcend from sympathy to political support. Malaysia is stuck between its relationship with Thailand as a neighbour, trading partner, and a member of ASEAN - bound by the rules of ASEAN and Southern Thailand where it has historical, religious and cultural relationships.

Malaysia has vested interest to maintain good relations with Bangkok due to economic interests and security concerns. Bilateral trade between the two nations grew at an average of 10.54 percent annually between 2013 to 2017 and the value of cross border trade between the two nations in 2017 was US$26.5 billion. (Dubey, 2017) In terms of security, Malaysia and Thailand have a good relationship. The two countries have never gone to war against each other, they have cooperated against communist rebellions in southern Thailand and most recently signed a joint security cooperation Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2017 in several fields including border security management, combating extremism as well as in cross border and transnational threats (BERNAMA, 2017). At the same time, Malaysia is very much affected by the conflict down south, with the inflow of a high number of irregular workers, place of sanctuary for insurgents on the run and to a certain extent local sentiment among the border states. This then brings to question Malaysia's role as a peacemaker as Malaysia is a stakeholder in the conflict.

11.1 Malaysia as the Peace Broker in the Region

Malaysia has tried to facilitate peace negotiations between Bangkok and the Deep South a number of times since 2005. Malaysia strongly pushed to establish dialogue as a key pathway towards a political solution. These include moves supported by the former Prime Minister Najib Razak known as the Thailand-MARA Patani process in 2015 but were derailed due to the absence of BRN to the most recent in January 2020, where Bangkok engaged for the first time in formal dialogue with BRN. The second round of talks was held in Kuala Lumpur in March but things have stalled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Malaysia has been trying to uplift their role to mediator from mere facilitator, since in practice they are already performing this function (International Crisis Group, 2020). However, Malaysia is finding it rather challenging to do so. Both Bangkok and BRN agree that Malaysia needs to be involved in the peace process, but there is still distrust within the ranks on both sides – questioning Malaysia's ability to be impartial. Within the BRN, especially those in exile, there is resentment towards the reported Malaysian pressure on BRN to join the MARA Patani process, while some Thai officials suspect that Malaysia's sympathies lie with the insurgents, given that so many are in exile in Malaysia. (International Crisis Group, 2019)

As of date, Malaysia is mentioned as a facilitator but no terms of reference has been made public. To add, a number of meetings have taken place between Bangkok and the insurgents in Berlin, Surabaya, Geneva and Hanoi where Malaysia was never invited.



The situation in the home country, past trauma and current challenges living in the host country collectively impacts a person and ultimately the community they reside in, both the Patani and the local Malaysian community. This section draws out implications for stakeholders committed to supporting the Patani-Muslim community in Malaysia. By integrating the CART analysis, the Patani community in Malaysia participated in the design of recommendations. This can be considered a form of "buy-in", as well as an important step to avoid impositions of what others (outside the community) deem necessary. The recommendations are divided into three areas; programme, policy and research.

12.1 Programmatic

12.1.1 Mental-Wellbeing

There is an immediate need for psycho-social support for communities both in Pattani and in Malaysia. As mentioned, each demographic is affected by the situation in the Deep South and will need intervention. The proposed programmes are:

i. Psycho-social support capacity building training workshops targeted for CSOs based in Malaysia and the Deep South working with:
    a. Young adults
    b. Women

ii. To set-up a psychological intervention centre in Malaysia, preferably Kelantan for affected communities in the Deep South who cannot access or distrust the local mental health facilities in Southern Thailand. Due to the geographical proximity, coming to Kelantan would be seamless.

12.1.2 Skills Building and Training

The lack of economic development is not only influencing migration but makes it hard for the local community to thrive. A key reason for the lack of investment is the violence but lack of education and skills makes it even more unattractive. The migration of Patani youths to Malaysia may have slowed down due to Covid-19 but it will continue and may increase again post Covid-19. The presence of Patani youths in Malaysia is an asset to Malaysia which should be further strengthened

This report proposes skills-based education and training programmes for youths particularly in the food and beverage sector. They are already servicing many Malaysians and it would be in the interest of Malaysians that we have an upgraded workforce.

12.2 Policy

12.2.1 Irregular Migrants

Malaysia needs to have a clear policy on irregular migrants since the Malaysian economy is dependent on them. In terms of Patani-Muslim irregular migrants in Malaysia, due to the fluidity as well as how the Malaysian population very much benefits by their presence while Thailand benefits from the remittance that they bring back, both governments should work towards a long-term sustainable solution that ensures the workers are protected, able to receive social security, insurance and healthcare access.

12.2.2 Access to UNHCR

Patani-Muslims running from persecution should be able to access the United Nation High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) where their claims can be assessed. This will put Malaysia in a tricky situation, but Malaysia had provided sanctuary to other groups fleeing persecution before such as those afforded to the displaced persons fleeing Mindanao and Vietnam in the 1970s.

12.3 Research

12.3.1 Study on Mental Health Wellbeing

There is a need to assess the psychological and overall well being of working aged youths migrating from the Deep South to Malaysia as the community is transient and fluid. The benefits of addressing their psychosocial wellbeing will impact both communities that they reside in whether in Southern Thailand or Malaysia. To add, children born just before 2004 are mostly young adults and would have lived most of their lives through the violence.

12.3.2 Study on the Impact of Violence Towards Children

As mentioned, one of the demographics that is affected by the on-going violence is children, yet little is known on how they are faring. Today's children are the potential "workers, voters, activists and innovators" of tomorrow. They are the key for sustainable and viable peace.



12.3.3 To Explore the Viability of Establishing an International Platform that Focuses on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Deep South

This report believes that this is key in pushing all parties especially authorities in adhering to reducing the violence. This mechanism has the potential in providing a spotlight on the Deep South but positively. It also allows the community to be involved in the process.

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United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 6th Session, Recommendations of the Cross Cultural Foundation (CrCF) and other Local Civil Society Organizations (3-21st

Interview respondents

	Gender	Age	Residential province in Thailand	Length of Stay in Malaysia (years)	Employment Status
Respondent 1	Male	28	Yala	16	Full Time
Respondent 2	Male	35	Pattani	16	Unemployed
Respondent 3	Male	23	Narathiwat	16	Odd Jobs
Respondent 4	Male	25	Yala	5	Full Time
Respondent 5	Male	26	Pattani	5	Full Time
Respondent 6	Female	29	Pattani	10	Full Time
Respondent 7	Female	28	Pattani	10	Full Time
Respondent 8	Female	30	Narathiwat	10	Full Time
Respondent 9	Male	28	Pattani	4	Full Time
Respondent 10	Male	30	N/A	5	Full Time
Respondent 11	Female	25	Pattani	2 & 3 m	Full Time
Respondent 12	Male	27	N/A	15	Full Time
Respondent 13	Male	34	N/A	5	Full Time
Respondent 14	Male	35	Pattani	16	Unemployed/ Disability
Respondent 15	Male	25	Yala	6	Odd Jobs
Respondent 16	Male	19	Yala	2	Student
Respondent 17	Male	18	Yala	4	Student

Stakeholders interviewed

Name	Organisation	Interview Date
Tan Sri Fuzi Ahmad	Ex-DG, Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations	Dec, 2020
Jazmi Abdullah	Ex-President, of Persatuan Pengusaha Tomyam Malaysia (PERTOM)	Dec, 2020 & Mar 2021
Benyamin Hamdi "Ben"	Chairmain of Pertubuhan Jaringan Cakna Warisan Nusantara (PENJANA)	Dec 2020
En Wan Embong	ABIM KELANTAN	Dec 2020
Abdullah Ma-Lee	Ex- Duacai activist, now residing and working in Malaysia	Sept 2020, Dec 2020, & Jan 2021
Amporn Marddent	Academic Walailak University	Dec 2020 & Jan 2021
Anchana Hemma	Duacai, Thailand	Dec 2020

To Note:
- Interviews with Datuk Seri Ahmad Zamzamin, Ex facilitator for the Dialogue was rescheduled a number of times due to MCO. It is now scheduled to be on 22 March 2020.
- We are waiting for a reply from Tan Sri Rahim Nor. Delays are due to the restriction under MCO.

IMAN RESEARCH

Informed Consent Form

Title of project: Youth Exodus: Forced Migration of Youths from Southern Thailand towards Malaysia

Location: Klang Valley / Pahang / Perak / Kedah / Kelantan / Terengganu

- I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
- I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason.
- I confirm that I have understood the risks and benefits of this study.
- I agree to be audio recorded as part of the research project.
- I understand that all the information I provide will be treated in confidence.

For further information, please feel free to contact the following two individuals;
IMAN Researcher: Nadia Lukman (nadialukman@imanresearch.com); or
IMAN Director of Operations: Altaf Deviyati (office@imanresearch.com).

Name of participant: ………………………………………………

Signature of participant: …………………………………………..

Date: …………………………………

Name of Researcher: ………………………………………………

Signature of Researcher: …………………………………………..

Date: ……………………………………

Suite 515, LG-1A, Bangsar Village, Jalan Telawi 1 Bangsar 59100 Kuala Lumpur Malaysia
+603 2202 0444 iman@imanresearch.com

Section 1

Bahagian 1

بهاڬين 1

Deep South: Intake form

Wilayah Sempadan Selatan Thailand: Maklumat awal

ويلايه سمڤادن سلاتن: معلومت اول

Please answer the following questions.

Sila jawab soalan-soalan berikut.

سيلا جواب سوءالن2 بريكوت

1. How long have you lived in this community? ____________________

Berapa lama anda tinggal di komuniti ini? ____________________

براڤ لام اندا تيڠڬل دالم كومونيتي (ชุมชน) اين؟

2. What is your sex? o Male o Female

Jantina anda? □ Lelaki □ Perempuan

جنتينا اندا؟ □ للاكي□ ڤرمڤوان

3. What is your current marital status?

Apakah status perkahwinan anda?

اڤكه ستاتوس ڤركهوينن اندا؟

o Married o Separated o Divorced o Widowed o Never Married

o Other (please specify): ____

□ Berkahwin □ Berpisah □ Bercerai □ Kematian pasangan □ Bujang

□ Lain-lain (sila nyatakan): ____

□ بركهوين (برنكاح)□ برڤيسه □ برچراي□ كماتين ڤاسڠن □ بوجڠ (بلوم نكاح)

□ لاءين2 (سيلا ڽاتكن)________________________________

4. What is your age? __________

Anda berumur berapa? __________

اندا برعمور براڤ؟__________

5. What is your race or ethnic identification? : ________________

Apakah identifikasi bangsa atau etnik anda? : ________________

10. Did you experience any negative life event before moving to Malaysia? No Yes

Adakah anda pernah mengalami kejadian yang buruk sebelum berpindah ke Malaysia? □ Ya □ Tidak

ادكه اندا ڤرنه مغالمي كجادين بورق سبلوم برڤيندهک مليسيا؟ □ يا □ تيدق

If yes, please describe what happened? _____

Kalau ya, sila nyatakan apa yang telah berlaku? _____

كالاو يا, سيلا ڽاتكن اڤ يڠ برلاكو؟

11. Have you ever had a personal emergency or crisis while living in your community? o No o Yes

Adakah anda pernah mengalami kecemasan atau krisis semasa anda tinggal dalam komuniti ini? □ Ya □ Tidak

اداكه اندا ڤرنه مغالمي كچمسن اتاو كريسيس (ฉุกเฉิน) سماس اندا تيڠڬل دالم كومونيتي اين؟

(For example, you might have had a major illness, been fired from a job, had a house fire, been the victim of a crime, experienced the death of a family member or neighbour. Has anything like this ever happened to you while living here?) <<If yes, continue to question 12.

(Misalnya, pernah mengalami kesakitan yang teruk, dibuang kerja, mengalami kebakaran, menjadi mangsa jenayah, mengalami kematian anggota keluarga atau jiran tetangga. Adakah perkara seperti ini pernah berlaku atas diri anda semasa anda tinggal di sini? << Kalau ya, sila jawab soalan 12.

(เหตุการณ์ร้ายแรง), ڤرنه مغالمي كساكيتن ڽاڠ تروق, دبواڠ كرجا, مغالمي كباكرن, منجادي مڠسا جنايه, مغالمي كماتين اڠڬوتا كلوارڬ اتاو جيرن تتڠڬ, اداكه ڤركارا سڤرتي اين ڤرنه برلاكو اتس ديري اندا سماس اندا تيڠڬل دسيني؟ كالاو يا, سيلا جواب سوالن12

12. Please think of the most significant emergency or crisis you have experienced while living in this community. Who helped you? (Check all that apply.)

Ketika anda mengalami kecemasan atau krisis yang paling besar setelah anda tinggal di dalam komuniti ini, siapakah orang yang memberikan pertolongan kepada nada? (Sila jawab semua jawapan yang sesuai.)

كتيک اندا مغالمي كچمسن (กรณีฉุกเฉิน) اتاو كريسيس ڽاڠ ڤالينڠ بسر سنله اندا تيڠڬل دي دالم كومونيتي اين, سياڤكه اورڠ ڽاڠ ممبريكن ڤرتولوڠن كڤد اندا؟ (سيلا جواب سموا جواڤن ڽاڠ سسواي)

o no one o family member o friends o anyone from the community/neighborhood

o faith-based organization o a local agency or organization o co-workers
o other (please specify): _____

□ Tidak ada □ Anggota keluarga □ Kawan □ Anggota komuniti/jiran tetangga

□ Pertubuhan agama □ Agensi atau organisasi tempatan □ Rakan sekerja

□ Lain-lain (sila nyatakan)

_____

3. Which border? (Perlis, Kedah, Perak, Kelantan)

Sempadan mana? (Perlis, Kedah, Perak, Kelantan)

سمڤادن مان؟ (ڤرليس, قدح, ڤيرق, كلنتن)

4. How much does it cost you?

Berapa banyak kos yang anda perlu membayar?

برالڤ بايق كوس يڠ اندا ڤرلو ممبايار؟

b. Do you have family members/friends who currently live here?

If yes, who are they?

Adakah kaum keluarga/kawan anda sekarang tinggal di sini?

Kalau ya, siapa?

ادكه قوم كلوارڬ\كاون اندا سكارڠ تيڠڬل دسيني؟

كالو يا, سياڤ؟

a. Your occupation?

Apakah pekerjaan anda?

اڤكه ڤكرجأن (อาชีพ) اندا؟

1. Is this your first job?

Adakah ini pekerjaan pertama bagi anda?

ادكه اين ڤكرجأن ڤرتام باڬي اندا؟

2. How are you able to get hired in Malaysia?

Bagaimanakah anda mendapat pekerjaan di Malaysia?

باڬايمان اندا مندافت ڤكرجأن دمليسيا؟

2. Education

Pendidikan

ڤنديديقكن

a. Your highest level of education?

Tahap pendidikan anda?

تاهف ڤنديديقكن (ระดับการศึกษา) اندا؟

1. Why did you not pursue your education at a higher level? (depending on level of education)

Mengapa anda tidak melanjutkan pelajaran ke peringkat yang lebih tinggi? (bergantung pada tahap pendidikan)

مڠاڤ اندا تيدق ملانجوتكن ڤلاجرن (ศึกษาต่อ) اندا كڤريكهة ڽاڠ لبيه تيڠڬي؟ (برڬنتوڠ ڤد تاهف ڤنديديكن)

b. What is your mother tongue?

□ تيدق اد □ اڠڬوتا كلوارڬ □ كاون □ اڠڬوتا كومونيتي\جيرن تتڠڬ □ فرتوبوهن اڤام □ اڤينسي (หน่วยงาน) اتاو اورڬانيسامي تمڤتن □ راكن سكرجا (เพื่อนร่วมงาน) □ لاين2 (سيلا ڽاتكن)

_____

Section 2

Bahagian 2

بهاڬين2

Deep South: Semi-Structured Interview

Wilayah Sempadan Selatan Thailand: Temu bual separa berstruktur

ويلايه سمڤادن سلاتن: تمو بوأل سڤارا سترو كتور

1. Migration

Migrasi

ميڬراسي

1. Why did you migrate?

Kenapa anda berpindah?

كناڤ اندا برڤينده؟

1. Why Malaysia?

Kenapa Malaysia?

كناڤ مليسيا؟

2. How long have you been in Malaysia?

Sudah berapa lama anda tinggal di Malaysia?

سوده برالڤ لام اندا تيڠڬل دمليسيا؟

b. How did you enter Malaysia?

Bagaimanakah anda memasuki Malaysia?

باڬايمان اندا مماسوقكي مليسيا؟

1. Legal/illegal?

Secara sah/tidak sah?

سجارا صح\تيدق صح؟

2. Who assisted you in the process?

Siapakah orang yang menolong anda dalam proses ini?

سياڤكه اورڠ ڽاڠ منولوڠ اندا دالم ڤروسيس (กระบวนการ) اين؟

1. Apakah bahasa ibunda anda?

اڤكه بهاس ايبوندا (ภาษาแม่) اندا؟

1. Do you read and write in your national language (Thai) proficiently?

Adakah anda boleh membaca dan menulis dalam bahasa kebangsaan (bahasa Thai) dengan lancer?

ادكه اندا بوليه ممباچ دان منوليس دالم بهاس كبڠسأن (بهاس تهاي) دڠن بأيق؟

b. What kind of schools do you attend?

Anda pernah belajar di sekolah jenis apa?

اندا بلاجر دسكوله جنيس اڤ؟

1. If it's Madrasah, is it registered with Thai government?

Jika anda pernah belajar di sekolah pondok, adakah sekolah anda berdaftar dengan kerajaan Thai?

جيک اندا بلاجر دسكوله ڤوندوق, ادكه سكوله اندا بردفتر (ลงทะเบียน) دڠن كراجأن؟

b. Did you receive any skills training before coming to Malaysia?

Adakah anda pernah mendapat sebarang latihan kemahiran sebelum datang ke Malaysia?

ادكه اندا ڤرنه منداڤت سبارڠ لاتيهن كماهيرن (การอบรมทักษะ) سبلوم داتڠ كمليسيا؟

1. If yes, what are the skills?

Kalau ya, kemahiran apa?

كالو يا, كماهيرن اڤ (ทักษะอะไร)؟

2. Identity

Identiti

ايدينتيتي\جاتي ديري

a. Do you identify yourself as a citizen of Thailand?

1. Adakah anda mengidentifikasi diri anda sebagai warganegara Thailand?

ادكا اندا مڠيدينتيفيكاسي ديري اندا سباڬاي ورڬانڬارا (สัญชาติ) تهايلاند؟

1. If no, explain.

Kalau tidak, sila jelaskan.

كالو تيدق, سيلا جلسكن.

b. How do you see yourself as a Muslim in Thailand?

Bagaimanakah anda melihat diri anda sebagai seorang Muslim di Thailand?

باڬأيمان اندا مليهت ديري اندا سباڬاي سؤرڠ مسلم دتهايلاند؟

c. What is it like being Malay in Thailand?

Bagaimanakah hidunya sebagai seorang Melayuy di Thailand?

باڬأيمانكه هيدوڤن سباڬاي سؤرڠ ملايو دتهايلاند؟

2. Violence

a. Keganasan

كڬانسن

a. Has your hometown in Southern Thailand experienced any violent incidents? Explain

Adakah kampung halaman anda di Selatan Thailand pernah mengalami insiden keganasan? Sila jelaskan.

ادكه كمڤوڠ هلامن (บ้านเกิด) اندا دسلاتن تهايلاند ڤرنه مڠالمي اينسيدين كڬانسن (เหตุรุนแรง)؟

1. What was your personal experience with violent incidents that occured at your hometown? Describe. (If yes)

Apakah pengalaman peribadi anda dengan insiden keganasan yang berlaku di dalam kampung halaman anda? SIla jelaskan. (Kalau ya)

اڤكه ڤڠالمن ڤريبادي اندا دڠن اينسيدين كڬانسن (เหตุรุนแรง) يڠ برلاكو ددالم كمڤوڠ هلامن اندا؟ (كالو يا)

b. Is violence are one of the reasons for your migration?

Adakah keganasan merupakan salah satu faktor yang mendorong anda untuk berpindah?

ادكه كڬانسن مروڤاكن ساله ساتو فكتور (ปัจจัย) يڠ مندوروڠ اندا اونتوق برڤينده؟

1. Identify one or more

Sila jawab satu atau lebih.

سيلا جواب ساتو اتاو لبيه

1. extrajudicial killings,

   Pembunuhan luar bidang kehakiman

   (วิสามัญฆาตกรรม) ڤوبونوهن لوار بيدڠ كحاكيمن

2. bombings

   Kejadian bom

   كجادين بوم

3. arbitrary detention and torture

   Penahanan sewenang-wenang dan penyeksaan

   (การควบคุมตัวและการซ้อมทรมาน) ڤناهنن سوينڠ2 دان ڤڽيكسأن

4. enforced disappearances

   Kehilangan secara paksa

   (การอุ้มหาย/บังคับสูญหาย) كهيلڠن سچارا ڤقسا

5. targeted intimidation by security forces

   Gangguan daripada anggota tentera

   ڬڠڬوان درڤد اڠڬوتا تنترا

6. others

   Lain-lain

   لأين2

b. Who are the perpetrators involved in the conflict?

Siapakah pelaku yang terlibat dalam konflik?

سياڤكه ڤلاكو يڠ ترليبت دالم كونفليک (ความขัดแย้ง)؟

c. Have you or your family members ever been detained?

Adakah anggota keluarga anda pernah ditahan?

ادكه اڠڬوتا كلوارڬ اندا ڤرنه دتاهن (ควบคุมตัว)؟

d. Have you experienced/witnessed traumatic experiences (human right violations, witnessed to any incidents stated in b)

Adakah anda mengalami/menyaksikan pengalaman yang menjadi trauma? (pencabulan hak asasi manusia, menyaksikan mana-mana insiden yang dinyatakan dalam b?

ادكه اندا مڠالمي\ميقسيكن ڤڠالمن يڠ منجادي تراوما (บาดแผลทางจิตใจ)؟ (ڤنچاجولن حق اساسي
مأنسي (การละเมิดสิทธิ), ميقسيكن مان2 اينسيدين سڠ دڽاتكن دالمb؟

Section 3

Bahagian 3

بهاڬين3

Deep South: CART-Core Community Resilience Survey

Wilayah Sempadan Selatan Thailand: Penyelidikan Kebingkasan Komuniti Teras

ويلايه سمڤادن سلاتن تهايلاند: ڤڽليديقن كبيڠكسن كمونيتي ترس

The following statements are possible descriptions of your community. Please circle one response for each statement. Adakah penyataan-penyataan berikut sesuai dengan komuniti anda? Sila tandakan jawapan anda dengan tanda bulat bagi setiap penyataan. **اداكه ڤرپاتاءن2 برايكوت سسواي دڠن كومونيتي (ชุมชน) اندا؟ سيلا تنداكن جواڤن اندا دڠن تندا بولت باڬي ستياڤ ڤرتاياءن**
Response Options: 1 Strongly Disagree 2 Disagree 3 Neither Disagree Nor Agree 4 Agree 5 Strongly Agree Jawapan: 1 Sangat tidak setuju 2 Tidak setuju 3 Mana-mana pun tidak 4 Setuju 5. Sangat setuju جواڤن:1 ساڠت تيدق ستوجو 2 تيدق ستوجو 3 مان2 ڤون تيدق 4 ستوجو 5 ساڠت ستوجو

Items						
1	People in my community feel like they belong to the community. Anggota komuniti saya merasakan bahawa mereka adalah sebahagian daripada komuniti. اڠڬوتا كومونيتي ساي مراسكن بهاوا مريک ادله سباهاڬين درڤد كومونيتي.	1	2	3	4	5
2	People in my community are committed to the well-being of the community. Anggota komuniti saya mengambil berat kebajikan komuniti. اڠڬوتا كومونيتي ساي مڠمبيل برت كباجيقن (สวัสดิการ) كومونيتي.	1	2	3	4	5
3	People in my community have hope about the future. Anggota komuniti saya mempunyai harapan untuk masa depan. اڠڬوتا كومونيتي ساي ممڤوڽاءي هارڤن اونتوق ماس دڤن.	1	2	3	4	5
4	People in my community help each other. Anggota komuniti saya tolong-menolong antara satu sama lain. اڠڬوتا كومونيتي ساي تولوڠ-منولوڠ انتارا ساتو سام لاءين (ช่วยกันซึ่งกันและกัน)	1	2	3	4	5
5	My community treats people fairly no matter what their background is. Komuniti saya memberikan layanan yang adikl kepada semua tanpa mengira latar belakang. كومونيتي ساي ممبريكن لاينن يڠ عاديل كڤد سموا تنڤا مڠيرا لاتر بلاکڠ.	1	2	3	4	5
6	My community has the resources it needs to take care of community problems (resources include money, information, technology, tools, raw materials, and services). Komuniti saya mempunyai sumber yang perlu untuk menyelesaikan masalah dalam komuniti (sumber ini termasuk wang, maklumat, teknologi, peralatan, bahan mentah, dan tenaga) كومونيتي ساي ممڤوڽاءي سومبر (ทรัพยากร) يڠ ڤرلو اونتوق مڽلسايكن مسئله دالم كومونيتي (سومبر اين ترماسوق واڠ, معلومت, تيكنولوڬي, ڤرالتن(อุปกรณ์), باهن منته, دان تناڬ)	1	2	3	4	5
7	My community has effective leaders. Komuniti saya mempunyai pemimpin yang berwibawa. كومونيتي ساي ممڤوڽاءي ڤميمڤين يڠ برويباوا.	1	2	3	4	5
8	People in my community are able to get the services they need. Anggota komuniti saya boleh mendapat perkhidmatan yang diperlukan اڠڬوتا كومونيتي ساي بوليه منداڤت ڤرخيدمتن يڠ دڤرلوكن.	1	2	3	4	5
9	People in my community know where to go to get things done. Anggota komuniti saya tahu cara penyelesaian masalah. اڠڬوتا كومونيتي ساي تاهو چارا ڤڽلساين مسئله.	1	2	3	4	5
10	My community works with organizations and agencies outside the community to get things done. Komuniti saya bekerja sama dengan organisasi dan agensi luar untuk menyelesaikan masalah. كومونيتي ساي بكرجا سام دڠن اورڬانيساسي دان اڬينسي (หน่วยงาน) لوار اونتوق مڽلسايكن مسئله.	1	2	3	4	5
11	People in my community communicate with leaders who can help improve the community. Anggota komuniti saya berkomunikasi dengan para pemimpin yang dapat memperbaiki komuniti. اڠڬوتا كومونيتي ساي بركومونيكاسي (ติดต่อสื่อสาร) دڠن ڤارا ڤميمڤين يڠ داڤت ممڤرباءيقي كومونيتي.	1	2	3	4	5

12	People in my community are aware of community issues that they might address together. Anggota komuniti saya sedar akan isu-isu dalam komuniti yang harus ditangani bersama. اڠݢوتا كومونيتي ساي سدر اكن ايسو2 دالم كومونيتي يڠ هاروس دتاڠني (รับมือ) برسام	1	2	3	4	5
13	People in my community discuss issues so they can improve the community. Anggota komuniti saya mengadakan perbincangan untuk memperbaiki komuniti. اڠݢوتا كومونيتي ساي مڠادكن ڤربينچڠن اونتوق ممڤرباءيقي كومونيتي.	1	2	3	4	5
14	People in my community work together to improve the community. Anggota komuniti saya bekerja sama untuk memperbaiki komuniti. اڠݢوتا كومونيتي ساي بكرجاسام اونتوق ممڤرباءيقي كومونيتي.	1	2	3	4	5
15	My community looks at its successes and failures so it can learn from the past. Lomuniti saya mengambil pelajaran daripada kejayaan dan kegagalan yang pernah dilalui. كومونيتي ساي مڠمبيل ڤلاجرن درڤد كجاياءن دان ككاݢلن يڠ ڤرنه دعالمي.	1	2	3	4	5
16	My community develops skills and finds resources to solve its problems and reach its goals. Komuniti saya meningkatkan kemahiran dan mencari sumber untuk menyelesaikan masalah dan mencapai matlamat. كومونيتي ساي منيڠكتكن كماهيرن (พัฒนาทักษะ) دان منچاري سومبر اونتوق مڽلسايكن مسئله دان منچاڤاي متلامت (บรรลุเป้าหมาย).	1	2	3	4	5
17	My community has priorities and sets goals for the future. Komuniti saya mempunyai keutamaan dan menentukan matlamat untuk masa depan. كومونيتي ساي ممڤوڽاءي كأوتاماءن دان مننتوكن متلامت اونتوق ماس دڤن.	1	2	3	4	5
18	My community tries to prevent disasters. Komuniti saya berusaha untuk mencegah bencana. كومونيتي ساي برأوسها اونتوق منچݢه بنچان\مصيبة(ป้องกันภัยพิบัติ).	1	2	3	4	5
19	My community actively prepares for future disasters. Komuniti saya mengadakan persiapan bagi bencana yang akan datang secara aktif. كومونيتي ساي مڠاداكن ڤرسياڤن باݢي بنچان\مصيبة يڠ اكن داتڠ سچارا اكتيف.	1	2	3	4	5
20	My community can provide emergency services during a disaster. Komuniti saya mampu menyediakan perkhidmatan kecemasan semasa bencana. كومونيتي ساي ممڤو مڽدياكن ڤرخيدمتن كچمسن (กรณีฉุกเฉิน) سماس بنچان\مصيبة.	1	2	3	4	5
21	My community has services and programs to help people after a disaster. Komuniti saya mempunyai perkhidmatan dan program untuk menolong orang setelah bencana. كومونيتي ساي ممڤوڽاءي ڤرخيدمتن دان ڤروݢرام اونتوق منولوڠ اورڠ ستله بنچان\مصيبة.	1	2	3	4	5
22	My community tries to prevent conflicts. Komuniti saya berusaha untuk mencegah konflik. كومونيتي ساي براوسها اونتوق منچڬه كونفليک\ڤربالهن (ป้องกันความขัดแย้ง).	1	2	3	4	5
23	My community actively prepares for possible conflicts. Komuniti saya bersedia untuk menangani konflik yang mungkin akan terjadi pada masa hadapan. كومونيتي ساي برسديا اونتوق مناڠني (รับมือ) كونفليک\ڤربالهن يڠ موڠكين اكن ترجادي ڤد ماس هادڤن.	1	2	3	4	5
24	My community can provide intervention to resolve/manage conflict. Komuniti saya boleh campur tangan untuk menyelesaikan/mengurus konflik. كومونيتي ساي بوليه چمڤور تاڠن (แทรกแซง) اونتوق مڽلسيكن\مڠوروس كونفليک (แก้ไข/บริหารความขัดแย้ง).	1	2	3	4	5
25	My community has services and programmes to help people after a conflict. Komuniti saya mempunyai perkhidmatan dan program untuk menolong orang setelah konflik. كومونيتي ساي ممڤوڽاءي ڤرخيدمتن دان ڤروݢرام اونتوق منولوڠ اورڠ ستله كونفليک\ڤربالهن.	1	2	3	4	5
	Ref: © 2011, Pfefferbaum RL, Pfefferbaum B, Van Horn RL					

Section 4

Bahagian 4

بهاݢين4

Deep South: Push and Pull Factors

Wilayah Sempadan Selatan Thailand: Faktor tolak dan tarik

ويلايه سمڤدن سلاتن: فكتور تولق دان تاريق

1. What were the reasons that made you leave home? (push)
   Apakah sebab yang mendorong anda meninggalkan kampung halaman anda? (tolak)
   اڤاكه سبب يڠ مندوروڠ اندا منيڠݢلكن كمڤوڠ هالمن اندا (บ้านเกิด)؟

1. What made you decide to come to Malaysia? (pull)
   Kenapa anda membuat keputusan untuk datang ke Malaysia (tarik)
   مڠاڤ اندا ممبوات كڤوتوسن (ตัดสินใจ) اونتوق داتڠ ک مليسيا؟

Bahagian 5

بهاݢين5

Deep South: Workshop Needs

Wilayah Sempadan Selatan Thailand: Keperluan untuk bengkel

ويلايه سمڤدن سلاتن: كڤرلوان اونتوق بيڠكيل (อบรมเชิงปฏิบัติ)

We are interested in conducting a workshop for community members/leaders. The main objective of the workshop is to provide key individuals basic support and counselling skills in order to provide assistance for their community members experiencing stress/trauma and crisis.

Kami bercadang mengadakan bengkel untuk anggota/pemimpin komuniti. Tujuan utama bengkel berkenaan adalah untuk memberikan bantuan asas dan kemahiran kaunseling kepada individu-individu yang memainkan peranan penting dalam komuniti, agar mereka dapat memberikan pertolongan kepada anggota komuniti yang mengalami tekanan/trauma dan krisis.

كامي برچادڠ مڠاداكن بيڠكيل اونتوق اڠݢوتا\ڤميمڤين كومونيتي. توجوان اوتام بيڠكيل بركناءن ادله اونتوق ممبريكن بنتوان اساس دان كماهيرن كاءونسليڠ (การให้คำปรึกษา) كڤد ايندۏيدو2 يڠ مماءينكن ڤرانن ڤنتيڠ دالم كومونيتي, اڬر مريک داڤت ممبريكن ڤرتولوڠن كڤد اڠݢوتا كومونيتي يڠ مڠالمي تكانن\تراوما دان كريسيس (วิกฤต)

1. What type of issues/areas of focus that you think would be useful?

   Pada pandangan anda, isu atau bidang fokus apa yang bermanfaat?

   ڤد ڤندڠن اندا, ايسو اتاو بيدڠ فوكس (ประเด็นหรือเรื่อง) اڤ يڠ برمنفعة؟

1. Is there any particular skill in caring or helping that you think is important?

   Pada pandangan anda, apakah kemahiran yang dipelrukan untuk memberikan layanan atau bantuan?

   ڤد ڤندڠن اندا, اڤاكه كماهيران (ทักษะ) يڠ دڤرلوكن اونتوق ممبريكن لاينن (การดูแล) اتاو بنتوان؟

1. Please indicate 5 issues from the following list that you think are the ones that needs to be addressed in the workshop:

   Sila pilih 5 isu daripada senarai di bawah yang menurut pandangan anda perlu diberi perhatian dalam bengkel.

   سيلا ڤيليه 5 ايسو درڤد سناراي دباوه يڠ منوروت ڤندڠن اندا ڤرلو دبري ڤرهاتيان دالم بيڠليل.

a. Grief/loss due to detention

   Kepiluan/kehilangan yang disebabkan oleh penahanan

   كڤيلوان\كهيلڠن يڠ دسببكن اوليه ڤنهنن (การควบคุมตัว).

b. Grief/loss due to forced disappearance

   Kepiluan/kehilangan yang disebabkan oleh kehilangan secara paksa

   كڤيلوان\كهيلڠن يڠ دسببكن اوليه كهيلڠن سچارا ڤقسا\ڤنچوليقن (การบังคับสูญหาย/การอุ้มหาย)

c. Grief/loss of physical presence due to migration

   Kepiluan/kehilangan yang disebabkan oleh perpindahan

   كڤيلوان\كهيلڠن يڠ دسببكن اوليه ڤرڤيندهن

d. Trust towards authority

   Kepercayaan terhadap pihak berkuasa

   كڤرچاياءن ترهادڤ ڤيهق بركواس

e. Anger

   Kemarahan

   كمارهن

f. Revenge

   Balas dendam

   بالس دندم

g. Assertiveness and communication

   Penegasan dan komunikasi

   ڤنڬسن دان كومونيكاسي (การสื่อสาร)

h. Decision making skills

   Kemahiran dalam membuat keputusan

   كماهيرن دالم ممبوات كڤوتوسن

i. Trauma

   Trauma

   تراوما

j. Others (please state): ___________

   Lain-lain (sila nyatakan): ___________

   لاءين2 (سيلا ڽاتكن)____________________